Inconsistency in Risk Preferences: A Psychophysical Anomaly by Ivo Vlaev
Inconsistency in risk preferences: a psychophysical anomaly
Ivo Vlaev*
Centre for Health Policy, Imperial College London, London, UK
*Correspondence: i.vlaev@imperial.ac.uk
There is a fundamental problem with the 
conceptualization of the individual agent in 
economics and public policy. At the heart 
of both domains is the notion that people 
should be able to make stable tradeoffs 
between different goods and quantities. 
For example, people might have to choose 
between the benefit gained investing money 
in a pension fund or in joining a gym to 
improve their health; or they may need 
to trade-off risk and return when choos-
ing a pension fund. Should policy makers 
help people make the right choices when 
faced with such difficult decisions? More 
pertinently, policy makers themselves fre-
quently need to arbitrate between dissimi-
lar options. For example, a minister may be 
forced to decide to fund hospitals rather 
than schools, and in doing so trade-off the 
health and education level of the popula-
tion. Recent theoretical and empirical work 
suggests, however, that people cannot make 
stable tradeoffs, i.e., independent of other 
available choice options or the context. This 
inability seems to reflect a basic property of 
human cognition that applies right across 
psychology, from the basic psychophysics 
of sound perception right through to high-
level cognitive processes in judgment and 
decision making.
This cognitive limitation has implica-
tions for economics and public policy 
where it raises important questions for the 
central methodologies used to measure and 
derive human preferences. Popular meth-
ods like functional measurement (Anderson 
and Zalinski, 1988) and conjoint analysis 
(Louviere, 1988; Green and Srinivasan, 1990) 
measure tradeoffs by asking respondents for 
attractiveness ratings of options (e.g., poli-
cies) consisting of pairs of attributes (e.g., a 
reduction of x% in the annual risk of death 
for £y). Ratings of this sort are useful if the 
tradeoffs are independent of other available 
options (e.g., “rationally irrelevant” factors 
like the range of values on each attribute). 
If a change from 30 to 60 min is worth a 
change from £10 to £20, then this should 
be true regardless of whether the range of 
available monetary options is from £10 
to £20 or from £1 to £200. Utility of each 
option should depend on its consequences, 
not on what other options are considered; 
yet, such independence is often not found 
(Baron, 1997).
AnomAlies in PsychoPhysics, 
choice, And VAluAtion
Preferences between pairs of options may 
often be reliable when the options are of 
the same qualitative type and/or differ on 
a single dimension. But interesting choices 
tend to be more challenging in two ways: 
they typically involve trading off between 
different dimensions and comparing quali-
tatively different types of outcome, which is 
difficult even on a single dimension (such 
as when “comparing apples and oranges”). 
This article focuses on explaining one 
prominent psychological anomaly, trade-
off inconsistency (TI), which violates the 
independence assumption of neoclassical 
economics. To illustrate TI, note that a per-
son may easily judge that eating marginally 
more calories is preferable to eating slightly 
fewer; and marginally less risk of diabetes 
is preferable to more. But deciding what to 
eat involves trading off between these, and 
other dimensions against factors such as the 
pleasure obtained from food; and people 
appear systematically inconsistent in mak-
ing such tradeoffs.
The basic underpinnings of this cog-
nitive limitation can be found in psycho-
physics. Psychophysical results indicate 
that people do not have access to mental 
representations of “absolute” magnitudes, 
at least for perceptual stimuli; and hence 
base their decisions on relative, not abso-
lute, values. For example, Garner (1954) 
asked people to choose a tone half-as-loud 
as a comparison tone. However, one group 
of people received candidate tones that 
included the half-as-loud tone but were 
mostly quiet, while another group received 
tones that also included half-as-loud tone 
but were mostly loud. In both groups, the 
recipients selected a tone in the middle of 
the range, so that the “quiet” group’s esti-
mates of the half-loudness were much lower 
than the “loud” group. The conclusion was 
that people have no grasp on absolute loud-
ness; instead, they are more influenced by 
the alternative choice options and scarcely 
at all by the comparison stimulus.
Inspired by Garner’s (1954) study and 
similar studies in psychophysics where it 
was shown that people have no grasp on 
absolute loudness (Laming, 1997), Stewart 
et al. (2003) showed that such psychophysi-
cal principles carry over to risky choice, 
where the option set (i.e., the context) 
affects peoples’ choices, because there is 
no fixed internal scale according to which 
people make their judgments of the val-
ues of certain options. In particular, when 
participants choose to trade-off risk and 
monetary return by choosing a gamble 
(“p chance of x”) from a varying range of 
options/gambles, the range (full range of 
options, only safe options, and only risky 
options) was found to almost completely 
determine the choice: people chose based 
not on absolute risk–return level, but on 
the risk–return level relative to the other 
available gambles. In parallel work on risky 
financial decisions, Vlaev et al. (2007a,b) 
found similar effects of skew and range, 
in line with the range–frequency theory 
of magnitude judgment (Parducci, 1965, 
1995). In particular, the range of options 
offered as potential saving levels and invest-
ment risks largely influenced the selected 
options, and the rank of riskiness of the 
investments affected the preferences for 
risky investment such that options with 
higher rank were considered as more risky 
and unattractive. Vlaev and Chater (2006, 
2007) report similar relativistic effects in 
strategic decision making, where people do 
not have absolute grip of the level of coop-
erativeness implicit in each social dilemma 
game and, instead, such games are assessed, 
and strategic choices are made, relative to 
the range, rank, or mean cooperativeness of 
previous games that have been encountered. 
Such relativistic responses are  inconsistent 
with an absolute measure of utility, or 
related concepts such as the value-function 
in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
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1979) and  rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 
1993), because these TIs cause preference 
reversals, which cannot be explained by 
classical, reference-, or rank-dependent 
utility models.
These results are related to other stud-
ies of context effects. Baron (1997) presents 
evidence that people judge the utility of a 
change or a difference as a proportion of the 
overall magnitude, even when the change 
alone is more closely related to their goal; 
and as a result, judgments are depend-
ent on the maximum magnitude on each 
attribute scale. Another classic example is 
the jacket-calculator problem of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981, p. 457; replicated by 
Darke and Freedman, 1993), which asks peo-
ple to make a hypothetical choice between 
a jacket for $125 and a calculator for $15. 
When respondents were informed that the 
calculator is on sale for $10 at another store 
located 20 min away, most of them preferred 
the trip to save the $5, but only few respond-
ents in another condition selected to make 
the trip to save $5 on the jacket, although the 
real trade-off is about whether one would 
be willing to drive 20 min for $5. Therefore, 
people judge the utility of saving $5 as a pro-
portion of the specific money attribute, not 
on the basis of a trade-off between money 
and time (opportunity cost); which goes 
against normative choice models such as 
multi-attribute utility theory (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976). Similar context effects are 
caused by relative reference points in studies 
of perception of economic attributes such as 
price (Niedrich et al., 2001).
Vlaev et al. (2009) demonstrate TI in an 
incentivized auction experiment (Becker-
DeGroot-Marshack, 1964), in which partici-
pants choose to pay to avoid painful electrical 
shocks. These valuations were determined 
by two factors: recent intensities of other 
pains – medium pain provoked markedly 
higher price offers when it occurred with low 
pain rather than high pain; and immediately 
disposable income – higher offers were made 
when the endowment-per-trial was higher 
(i.e. individual ‘overall wealth’, which should 
not be affected by the small variations in the 
endowments per trial, was not an impor-
tant factor) (see Figure 1). The estimated 
consumer-demand curves for pain relief, 
which indicate the quantity of pain relief 
expected to be bought at different prices, 
also exhibited relativistic patterns – higher 
demand for relief from medium pain when 
paired with low rather than high pain. This 
is qualitative incommensurability (QI). This 
principle postulates that people are unable 
to systematically compare qualitatively 
different options or outcomes on a single 
value dimension – an assertion based on 
existing evidence that such comparisons 
are extremely difficult (Luce and Green, 
1978; Stewart and Chater, 2003). Recent 
psychophysical research has suggested 
that basic judgments of perceptual quan-
tities like loudness, qualitatively different 
stimuli cannot be consistently compared, 
even when judged on the same attribute, and 
judgments are distorted by the influence of 
previous context. Stewart and Chater (2003) 
presented participants with two different 
auditory stimuli, either pure tones or white 
noise (“buzzes”) delivered independently 
via headphones to each ear, and the task 
was to choose the loudest tone. The loud-
ness of previous items strongly influenced 
the perceived loudness of the present item, 
but this effect was reduced when items were 
qualitatively different – a previous loud 
“tone” made a present “tone” quieter, but 
not a present “buzz,” thus modifying the 
choice between them. Where this phenom-
enon occurs in relation to choices that are 
presumed to reveal preference (e.g., choice 
between using money to preserve a 80 acres 
of marshland vs. providing clean drinking 
water for 2000 people), we face a substan-
tial puzzle, because preference reversals 
will be generated by varying the previous 
items (e.g., saving 180 acres of marshland vs. 
suggests that the subjective value attributed 
to pain relief is remarkably malleable and 
people cannot establish a stable trade-off 
between money and pain (note that stable 
trade-off is assumed in economic valuation 
of pain, which informs the market price of 
analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical 
treatments, compensation for injury, and 
the response to public hazards). Ariely et al. 
(2003) demonstrated similar reference-
dependence of preferences by showing that 
willingness-to-pay to avoid aversive stimuli 
is strongly biased toward arbitrary price 
anchors.
Another type of TI is due to variation in 
decision “content” (different from “context” 
or the choice set), which produces varia-
tion in preferences for risk, because peo-
ple’s knowledge of event frequencies “leaks” 
into decisions even when event likelihood 
information is explicitly provided (Kusev 
et al., 2009).
In summary, the fact that individuals 
are subject to contextual biases, and as a 
result behave inconsistently, is important. 
From this basis, this article aims to offer an 
explanatory account of such TI effects.
commensurAbility exPlAins 
inconsistent decision mAking
Trade-off inconsistency are not cognitive 
oddities – they arise systematically from 
basic properties of the cognitive system. 
A fundamental cognitive principle, which 
promises to explain the above phenomena, 
Figure 1 | Mean price offers (in pence) for the three pain levels, depending on endowment and 
context pairing (Vlaev et al., 2009). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The medium pain 
provoked markedly higher price offers when it occurred with low pain in both 40 pence and 80 pence 
endowments. All pain levels received higher offers when the endowment per trial was 80 pence.
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ence should not affect her initial trade-off 
(e.g., by making her demand two apples 
for two oranges). Reference-dependent 
utility theories predict that the pleasure 
from these apples and oranges should be 
reduced, while the trade-off is preserved, 
which happens irrespective of whether 
she tries a delicious apple, orange, or any 
other fruit; because, the greater new util-
ity affects all smaller utilities by changing 
their reference points (i.e., the pleasure 
from eating apples is not calculated on a 
separate utility scale). QI predicts that the 
trade-off is likely to vary depending on the 
commensurability between two options, 
and thus can differentially undermine the 
quality of choice. Therefore, the cases in 
which QI is strong enough to lead to con-
text effects and preference reversals are 
the most intriguing.
To summarize, QI is a prominent psy-
chological anomaly that has implications 
for explaining TI in choice and valuation 
across decision domains like health, the 
environment, finance, and consumer-
spending. There are also crucial implica-
tions for normative theories of rational 
choice, consumer-theory (e.g., calculat-
ing a “commensurability index” between 
products before deriving their indifference 
curves), and the practical methodology of 
valuing non-market goods.
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clean drinking water for 1000 people). But 
then which choice reveals a person’s “true” 
preference? There is no “neutral” context in 
which psychophysical, or other, judgments 
are made. Hence, this result raises concerns 
over the extent to which contextual effects 
undermine our ability to stably trade-off 
between qualitatively different goods.
Stewart and Chater’s (2003) results 
in “perceptual choice” (see also Luce and 
Green, 1978) imply that even apparently 
similar dimensions (loudness of sounds) 
may not be commensurable. Psychophysical 
research also reveals that the decision con-
text determining choice is often the imme-
diately preceding stimuli, as in the related 
domain of absolute magnitude identifica-
tion (Stewart et al., 2005).
In “preferential choice,” most inter-
esting decisions also involve comparing 
incommensurable properties – e.g., die-
tary restraint against risk of heart disease, 
mobility maintenance in patients against 
pain avoidance, financial vs. environmental 
factors, investment risk vs. return. Consider 
a person on a diet who may find it difficult 
to assess the pleasure they may get from 
either of two 100 calorie treats: a thin sliver 
of cake, or 10 grapes; likewise, a typical 
public policy budgeting decision involve 
relating qualitatively different outcomes, 
such as heart transplants, educational pro-
grams, or air quality improvements, against 
a fixed overall budget. These choices are dif-
ficult in part due to a lack of information 
(e.g., about how health behaviors relate to 
levels of health risk; or in public policy, the 
amount of marginal health, educational, or 
environmental benefit per pound spent). 
QI implies that the problem is more fun-
damental – even with perfect information, 
basic properties of the cognitive system 
appear to show that such preferences are 
undefined.
In contrast, normative theories and 
their descriptive deviations assume that 
an attribute’s value is “translated” into a 
single underlying measure called “util-
ity,” which can be positive or negative; 
and after all attributes are independently 
“mapped” on this “common currency” 
scale, the overall utility of an option is 
determined by some additive process. To 
illustrate this point, imagine that a per-
son is indifferent between eating an apple 
and two oranges, and she tries another 
extremely delicious fruit. Normative deci-
sion theories predict that this new experi-
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